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Home » Central Excise Act and1944 | Commissioner of Central Excise,Bangalore v. Srikumar Agencies and Others, C.A. No. 4872 of 2000 SC

Central Excise Act and1944 | Commissioner of Central Excise,Bangalore v. Srikumar Agencies and Others, C.A. No. 4872 of 2000 SC

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Central Excise Act and1944 | (2009) 1 SCC 469

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Justice Dr.Arijit Pasayat, Justice P.Sathasivam and Justice Aftab Alam

2008-11-27T00:00:00

C.A. No. 4872 of 2000

J U D G M E N T

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Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J

1. These appeals were placed before a three-Judge Bench because of reference
made by a Division Bench with the following order:

"The point involved in this batch of appeals is whether the printing on the
package is merely incidental or primary. On this point we find that there are
two streams of judgments of this Court. Therefore, keeping in view the conflict
of opinion, on the point involved in Rollatrainers Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of
India & Ors.

(1994 Suppl. (3) SCC 293), Collector of Central Excise, Bombay v. Paper Print
& Products Co. (1997 (10) SCC 564) and Metagraphs Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of
Central Excise, Bombay (1997 (1) SCC 262), we deem it appropriate that these
cases be placed for hearing before a larger Bench.

Registry is directed to place the matter before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for
appropriate orders."


2. When the appeals were taken up for hearing, Mr. G.E. Vahanvati, learned
Solicitor General pointed out that the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control)
Appellate Tribunal, Chennai (in short `CEGAT') disposed of several appeals
without detailed analysis of the factual position involved. It merely referred
to some judgments and submissions of learned counsel for the assessees who are
present respondents to hold that the assessees are entitled to relief. The
conclusions are practically non-reasoned and abrupt conclusions were arrived at
to hold that printing on media was not merely incidental to its primary use but
in fact clearly show the nature of goods contained therein. It is pointed out
that five categories were involved. In the case of respondents -Srikumar
agencies the article involved was Printed Gay Matter and Printed Agarbathi, in
the case of M/s Faxwell Printers the 2 article involved was Printed Gay
Wrappers, in the case of M/s Rajhans Enterprises the article involved was
Printed Labels, in the case of Sree Vijay Industries, it was Printed Agarbathi
Labels and in the case of Regency Printers, it was Printed Labels. The articles
were contextually different. It was also submitted that without detailed
anaylsis of the factual position mere reliance on the decisions was not the
proper way to dispose of the appeals. It is also pointed out that the view
expressed by CEGAT even on facts was contrary to the ratio laid down by this
Court in I.T.C. Ltd. v.

Collector of Central Excise, Madras (JT 1998 (8) SC 527).


3. In response, learned counsel for the respondents-assessees submitted that
the CEGAT is the last finding authority. From its varied experience having dealt
with large number of cases, even by visual inspection of the materials it was in
a position to record a conclusion. It is also submitted that the factual
scenario is not different in these cases vis-a-vis those assessees whose cases
were the subject matter of the decisions which have been referred to by CEGAT.


4. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how
the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on 3 which
reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's
theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their
context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to
have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To
interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary
for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to
explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret
judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be
interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co.

Ltd. V. Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:

"The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima
vertra of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and
applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract
from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most
distinguished judge."

In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said,
"Lord Atkin's speech…..is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition
It will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J in (1971) 1 WLR
1062 observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of
Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, 4 in Herrington v.
British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said:

"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as
though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered
that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case."


5. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a
world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by
blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.

The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have
become locus classicus:

"Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case
and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the
entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide
cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour
of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the
broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive."

*** *** *** 5 "Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path
of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else
you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the
path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it."


6. Since the factual position has not been analysed in detail, disposal of
appeals by mere reference to decisions, was not the proper way to deal with the
appeals. The CEGAT also does not appear to have dealt with the relevance and
applicability of ITC's case (supra) on which strong reliance has been placed by
learned Solicitor General. The CEGAT ought to have examined the cases
individually and the articles involved. By clubbing all the cases together and
without analyzing the special features of each case disposing of the appeals in
the manner done was not proper. In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned
judgment in each case and remit the matter to CEGAT presently known as Customs,
Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal ( in short `CESTAT') to be dealt
with by the appropriate Bench. In view of the aforesaid order there is no need
to answer the reference made.


7. Since the matters are pending since long, we request the CESTAT to dispose
of the appeals as early as possible preferably by the end of February, 2009.

6 8. The appeals are accordingly disposed of.

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